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Abstract.
In this paper we have sought to bring together several strands of our work, on motiva-
tion, autonomous agents and interaction between agents, to show how creativity can have a
central place within what might be considered rather straightforward aspects of the design of
modern computing systems. We review our previous work on the SMART agent framework,
and re-interpret it in light of considerations of creativity arising from autonomy, motivation
and contributing to the process of autonomous interaction. Here, behaviour is not prescribed
but is determined in relation to motivation, leading to different, potentially creative outcomes
for different individuals, especially during the process of interaction. Moreover, considering
interaction as discovery imbues it with the same creative aspect as in scientific discovery, in
which it can be argued that creativity plays a significant role in theory formation and revision.
In fact, these are two sides of the same coin: in our view, the creativity in discovery arises
from the motivation and autonomy of the individual involved.
Keywords: Autonomy, Motivation, Interaction and Creativity
1. Introduction
Much recent work on the design and development of multi-agent systems,
together with all that they entail, has provided a means of enabling multiple
different computational entities to work together effectively and efficiently.
Fundamental to this work is the notion of interaction, first since agreements
between the agents involved is typically established through interaction by
means of communication to determine what to do and how to do it, and
second since the enactment of joint work is typically established by explicit
cooperation and coordination.
If agents are designed to be benevolent, or are simply invoked like func-
tions or objects, then this interaction is in many ways straightforward. How-
ever, such systems are limited; the real value of multi-agent systems lies in
the interaction of entities that are autonomous and can decide for themselves
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whether to engage with others, and to refuse to cooperate when it is not
their own individual interest to do so. Moreover, such autonomous agents
are particularly important in real world environments that admit an inherent
uncertainty that must be considered if we are to cope with more than just
toy problems. Here, agents must be autonomous, since they cannot know in
advance the exact effects of their own actions or those of others. Agents must
therefore be designed with a flexibility that enables them to cope with this
uncertainty by evaluating it and responding to it in adequate ways.
This paper is concerned with the design of autonomous agents for inter-
action: what it means for an agent to be autonomous and what that entails for
an appropriate model of interaction between autonomous agents. We argue
that autonomy arises through the ability of an agent to generate its own goals,
in support of a set of non-derivative motivations that cause the agent to act
and reason. In this light, motivation also drives autonomous interaction, with
agents engaging in communication processes that have uncertain outcomes
(as they must in any real world context). Given this view, we develop a model
for autonomous interaction that can be viewed as a process of discovery (like
scientific discovery), making predictions about the outcomes of actions and
communications, and adjusting an internal model of the world when predicted
outcomes are not realised.
One interesting consequence of this view of both autonomy and of interac-
tion, is that we can understand the involvement of creativity in two respects.
First, behaviour is not prescribed but determined in relation to unique indi-
vidual motivations, leading to different outcomes for different individuals,
with the potential for creativity that entails. Second, considering interaction
as discovery imbues it with the same creative aspect as in scientific discovery,
in which it can be argued that creativity plays a significant role in theory
formation and revision. In fact, these are two sides of the same coin: in our
view, the creativity in discovery arises from motivation and autonomy of the
individual involved.
The paper is an effort to bring together different aspects of previous work,
reported in (d’Inverno and Luck, 1996; d’Inverno and Luck, 2004; Luck and
d’Inverno, 1995; Luck and d’Inverno, 1998) in showing how autonomy and
creativity are fundamental to agent behaviour and interaction, and seeks to
re-interpret the work in that light. The paper continues, in the next section,
with a discussion of creativity and its relation to interaction, and in Section
3, with a more detailed consideration of motivation and how it gives rise
to autonomy. In Section 4, we review the SMART agent framework before
showing how this supports goal generation and adoption in Section 5, and
autonomous interaction in Section 6. The paper concludes in Section 7.
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2. Creativity and Interaction
2.1. CREATIVITY
In her seminal book (Boden, 2004), Boden essentially argues that creativity is
the ability to produce things that are new, surprising and valuable. These in-
clude poems, compositions and other artworks or artefacts, such as paintings,
sculpture or architecture, but also apply to scientific theories in the context of
the progression of science and scientific discovery, as well as daily activities
such as new jokes or the penning of a satirical cartoon.
In terms of newness, there are two notions of creativity: psychological or
P-creativity, which is a process that provides a new, surprising and valuable
idea to the person who created it; and historical or H-creativity, which is a
process that provides an idea that has not been known to be reported at all.
In this respect, newness is in the eye of the beholder; what is new to one
individual in this way may not be so to another. Similarly, surprise may arise
simply from the unfamiliar (Macedo and Cardoso, 2002), it may fit into a
style of thinking that existed previously but to which an observer had not
made the link, or it may be a high-level concept that relates to the seemingly
impossible. The idea of value is the most difficult to pin down, and can be
understood through many parameters such as aesthetic, medical, financial and
societal, for example, the value of which no two observers may agree. (It is
perhaps the most personal element of creativity, which is why some authors
have tried to avoid it and develop models of creativity that do not involve such
concepts (Dorin and Korb, 2012).)
Boden’s view of creativity thus offers plenty of scope for an entirely per-
sonal view of what is creative. We agree that creativity is an almost intangible
but personal concept, and one that arises from the differences between indi-
viduals, and the ways in which they decide what to do and how to do it.
Moreover, the idea that recognition of creativity is in the eye of beholder,
with differences between individuals, suggests a very strong relationship to
notions of autonomy by which individuals determine their own courses of
decision and action.
It is also interesting, and relevant, to note that aside from artistic no-
tions of creativity, perhaps the most prominent claim for creativity arises in
scientific discovery, when new concepts that differ from prevailing views,
seemingly appear through particular intangible characteristics of the scientist
or scientific process. Indeed, the traditional view of scientific discovery holds
that there is a clean and simple division between the contexts of discovery
and justification. The context of discovery is concerned with the creation
of hypotheses and theories, while that of justification is concerned with the
testing of those theories and their subsequent refutation or continued use (at
least temporarily). Discovery is deemed irrational and outside the scope of
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theories of scientific discovery, while the logical procedures of justification
are capable of rational investigation (and by extension, automation). There
are arguments against the rationality of justification, but these are limited and
narrow, and shall not be considered here. However, the context of discovery
is particularly problematic because it lies outside rigorous logical procedures,
and is often explained by reference to insight, intuition, creativity, and a host
of sociological and psychological factors. It has consequently been referred
to as the Aha! reaction (previously referred to as the Aha! experience by psy-
chologists of the Gestalt school, to label experiences in which an individual
utters “Aha!” during a moment of revelation; see, for example, (Weisberg,
2006), for more on the Aha! reaction).
In considering agent interaction as a process of discovery, as we do in
this paper, we thus see creativity in two aspects: first in the individual views
of agents in driving their own behaviour through motivated autonomy, and
second in the process itself that is analogous to the theory formation or re-
vision of scientific discovery. In the next section, we consider autonomous
interaction in more detail, and outline some key problems that motivate our
particular approach, before proceeding to a consideration of how autonomy
may be achieved in machines and, subsequently, its role in our model of
interaction between autonomous entities.
2.2. AUTONOMOUS INTERACTION
In multi-agent systems, the interactions between agents are the basis for use-
fully exploiting the capabilities of others. However, such a pragmatic ap-
proach has not been the concern of many researchers who instead have some-
times focussed on small areas of interaction and communication, and in par-
ticular on specialised forms of intention recognition and interpretation. In-
deed, in many existing models of interaction, agents are not autonomous.
Problem-solving can be considered to be the task of finding actions that
achieve current goals. Traditionally, goals have been presented to systems
without regard to the problem-solving agent, so that the process is divorced
from the reality of an agent in the world. This is inadequate for models of
autonomy that require an understanding of how such goals are generated and
adopted, as we have considered previously (d’Inverno and Luck, 1996).
In traditional models in which the goals of one agent are adopted by
another, goals are broadcast by one agent, and adopted by other agents ac-
cording to their own relevant competence (Smith, 1980). This assumes that
agents are already designed with common or non-conflicting goals that facili-
tate the possibility of helping each other satisfy additional goals. Negotiation
as to how these additional goals are satisfied typically takes the form of
mere goal-node allocation. Thus an agent simply has to communicate its
goal to another agent for cooperation in the form of joint planning to ensue.
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The concept of benevolence — that agents will cooperate with other agents
whenever and wherever possible — has no place in modelling autonomous
agents (Castelfranchi, 1990; Galliers, 1990). Cooperation will occur between
two parties only when it is considered advantageous to each party to do so.
Autonomous agents are thus rational agents (that are selfish in the sense of
seeking to maximise their utility), and a goal (whether traditionally viewed
as selfish or altruistic) will always be adopted so as to satisfy a selfish mo-
tivation. This view of goal adoption and allocation still dominates in one
form or another, and can be seen in other models of interaction including
communication based on Speech Act Theory (SAT), for example.
Indeed, SAT (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969), underlies much existing work
in AI (Campbell and d’Inverno, 1990), typically because as Appelt points
out, speech acts are categorisable and can be modelled as action operators in
a planning environment (Appelt, 1985). However, this work admits a serious
flaw. Although the preconditions of these operators are formulated in terms
of the understanding of the planning agent, the post-conditions or effects of
these operators do not update the understanding of the planning agent, but
of the agent at whom the action is directed (Allen, 1979). Yet no agent can
ever actually know with any certainty anything about the effects of an action,
whether communicative or otherwise. It is only through an understanding of
the target agent and through observing the future behaviour of that agent,
that one can discover the actual effects of the interaction. This uncertainty
is inherent in communication between autonomous agents and must be a
feature of any model of interaction that hopes to reflect this reality. While
SAT underpins many models of communication, there remain many open
issues, including this particular concern, that continues to engage the research
community (Chopra et al., 2011).
Moreover, much work has modelled communicative actions in terms of
mutual beliefs about the operator and its known effects (Perrault, 1990). This
proposes to show not only how certain mental states lead to speech actions,
but how speech actions affect mental states. We have argued previously (d’Inverno
and Luck, 1996) that any account of autonomous interaction should only
model the effects of an action upon the mental state of the agent initiating the
interaction (or another single agent). Agents must make their own decisions
about how and why they should take part in an interaction, and be aware of
the consequences of doing so (d’Inverno et al., 2011; Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al.,
2006).
In summary, there are several important claims here: first, an agent cannot
be truly autonomous if its goals are provided by external sources; second, an
agent will only adopt a goal and thus engage in an interaction if it is to its
advantage to do so; third, the effects of an interaction cannot be guaranteed;
fourth, the intentions of others cannot always be recognised; fifth, an agent
can only know about itself with certainty (though it may also know some
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things about others). Note that the first claim requires goals to be generated
from within. It is this internal goal generation that demands an explicit model
of the motivations of the agent. The second claim requires a notion of advan-
tage that can only be determined in relation to the motivations of the agent.
The third and fourth claims demand that the uncertain nature of autonomous
interaction be explicitly addressed. We argue that viewing autonomous inter-
action as motivated discovery provides us with a means for doing this. Finally,
the fifth claim imposes constraints on the problem we are considering, and
provides a strong justification for our concern with constructing a model of
autonomous interaction from the perspective of an individual agent.
In what follows, we address the five issues detailed above, first by exam-
ining the mechanisms of autonomy and motivation that underpin the SMART
agent framework, which is described next, and used as the basis for our model
of interaction.
3. Autonomy and Motivation
3.1. MOTIVATION
According to Halliday, the word motivation does not refer to a specific set
of readily identified processes (Halliday, 1983), but is instead considered in
terms of drive and incentive. Here, drives are related to physiological states
such as the deprivation of food, hormones, etc., while incentives refer to
external stimuli that affect motivation, such as the presence of food as an
incentive to eat.
Some work from the field of psychology offers insight into the kinds of
considerations we are concerned with, and in particular in their role in reason-
ing and action. Kunda, for example, informally defines motivation to be, “any
wish, desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a given reasoning
task,” and suggests that motivation affects reasoning in a variety of ways
including the accessing, constructing and evaluating of beliefs and evidence,
and decision-making (Kunda, 1990). Such arguments are supported by a large
body of experimental research, but no attempt is made to address the issue of
how motivations may be represented or applied in a computational context.
Computational work has also recognised the role of motivations, from
very early work 30 years ago, to much more recent efforts (Kasmarik et al.,
2005). For example, in some foundational work, Simon takes motivation to
be “that which controls attention at any given time,” and explores the rela-
tion of motivation to information-processing behaviour, but from a cognitive
perspective (Simon, 1979). Sloman and Croucher elaborate on Simon’s work,
showing how motivations are relevant to emotions and the development of a
computational theory of mind (Sloman, 1987; Sloman and Croucher, 1981).
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More specifically, in proposing to develop a computational architecture of
a mind, they make explicit mention of the need for a “store of ‘springs of
action’ (motives)” (Sloman and Croucher, 1981). In the same paper, they try
to explicate his notion of a motive as being a representation used in decid-
ing what to do, including desires, wishes, tastes, preferences and ideals. The
key feature of a motive, according to Sloman and Croucher, is not in the
representation itself, but in its role in processing. Importantly, they distin-
guish between motives on the one hand, and mere subgoals on the other.
“Sometimes,” they claim, “a mere subgoal comes to be valued as an end,”
because of a loss of reason information. In this view, what are known as first-
order motives directly specify goals, while second-order motives generate
new motives or resolve conflicts between competing motives — they are
termed motive generators and motive comparators. According to Sloman and
Croucher, a motive produced by a motive generator may thus have the status
of a desire. This relatively early work presents a broad picture of a two-tiered
control of behaviour: motives occupy the top level, providing the drive or
urge to produce the lower level goals that specify the behaviour itself. In sub-
sequent work, the terminology changes to distinguish between nonderivative
motivators or goals and derivative motivators or goals, rather than between
motivators and goals themselves. Nevertheless, the notion of derivative and
nonderivative mental attitudes makes one point clear: that there are two levels
of attitude, one that is in some sense innate, and that gives rise to the other,
which is produced as a result of the first.
Consider the example of crossing a river. The goal is to get to the other
side of the river, but the way in which that goal will be achieved depends
on the motivations that generated the goal. In normal circumstances, one
would look for a bridge or a boat to get across. Though this may involve
more effort than swimming across immediately, it is preferable because it is
more comfortable. If there are urgent reasons for crossing the river, however,
such as being pursued by a wild animal, then it might be better to jump into
the river and swim across instead despite the discomfort this may cause. In
both cases, the motivations are different and their strengths are different, but
the goal remains the same. Motivations act as a control strategy for achieving
the goal, directing reasoning, and providing it with the flexibility and strength
that is often lacking.
3.2. CLASSES OF MOTIVATION
Much of the psychological literature stresses the distinction between two
kinds of motivated reasoning phenomena (see (Kunda, 1990) for a review).
These are reasoning in which the motivation is to arrive at an accurate conclu-
sion, and reasoning in which the motivation is to arrive at a particular directed
conclusion (towards some particular end rather than simply for knowledge).
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Kunda (1990) suggests that both kinds of motivation affect reasoning by influ-
encing the choice of beliefs and strategies applied to a given problem, but that
they differ in the following respect: accuracy goals lead to the use of those be-
liefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate in getting the correct
result, while directional goals lead to the use of those that are most likely to
give the desired though perhaps inaccurate result. According to Kunda, accu-
racy goals thus demand greater (cognitive) effort on reasoning, more careful
attendance to relevant information, and its deeper processing with more com-
plex reasoning strategies. Directional goals impose constraints on “search and
belief construction” that lead to support for the desired conclusion.
Similar distinctions have also been noted by others. In artificial intel-
ligence, Ram and Leake (1991) describe two classes of goals motivating
explanation at a lower level: knowledge goals that reflect an internal need for
information, and goals based on accomplishing tasks in the external world.
In psychology, Barsalou has distinguished between explicit problem-solving
goals and implicit orientation goals for maintaining a world model (Leake and
Ram, 1993). In education, Ng has distinguished task completion goals (such
as completing an assignment) from instructional goals (what the assignment
is intended to teach,) and knowledge-building goals, which relate to a stu-
dent’s own purposes and agenda for learning (Leake and Ram, 1993). Yet
another formulation of this distinction is characterised as exploration (knowl-
edge and accuracy goals) versus exploitation (directional, task-based goals)
in a number of domains. All these are mirrored in the division of motivations
below into knowledge motivations and action motivations.
3.2.1. Motivations for Knowledge
The motivation relating to the discovery of knowledge can be found every-
where, even in very limited models of simple creatures, either explicitly, or by
a different name such as curiosity (eg., (Maes, 1991; Schmidhuber, 1991)).
Any motivation that leads to the exploration of environment to discover more
can be regarded as a motivation for knowledge. The desire for knowledge is
relatively constant — even when action is taken to achieve some unrelated
goal (to satisfy an unrelated motivation), it provides information that may
be used to update a repository of knowledge. Consider, for example, eating
a green banana because of hunger. Eating the banana not only satisfies the
hunger motivation, but it also provides the knowledge that green bananas are
not sweet. Such knowledge is always of interest and we are always motivated
to acquire new knowledge even if it results from other actions.
3.2.2. Motivations for Action
Other motivations can be said to come under the broad heading of motivations
for action. In this case, the motivations lead to the execution of certain actions
and consequently to the manipulation of the environment in order to achieve
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goals. Traditional planning systems, for example, are motivated for action in
that they generate plans for effecting changes in the world. These motivations
are thus action motivations, and include motivations such as hunger, laziness
and pleasure that lead to the taking of particular actions (or exhibition of
behaviour). Action motivations vary in strength depending on circumstances;
their strength may increase to a point at which they demand satisfaction, and
also decrease once they have been satisfied. In the example of crossing the
river when being chased by a wild animal, the strength of the fear motivation,
say, caused the immediate action of swimming across the river. After having
satisfied the motivation by fleeing across the river, the relative safety might
lead to the strength of the fear motivation decreasing substantially.
An example illustrating this difference between motivations for knowl-
edge and those for action is Crick and Watson’s discovery of the double helix
of DNA. In attempting to become the first to discover the structure of DNA,
they used quick and dirty rather than the most reliable methods. Their first
attempt at a model was a fiasco, according to Crick (1988), partly because of
“ignorance” on his part, and “misunderstanding” on Watson’s. By contrast,
work by Wilkes and Franklin was progressing slowly as they concentrated on
using their experimental data as fully as possible, and avoided resorting to
guessing the structure by trying various models. Crick states that Franklin’s
experimental work was first class and could not be bettered, while Watson
simply wanted to get at the answer as quickly as possible by sound methods or
flashy ones. While the actual motivations of the individual researchers cannot
be known, their apparent motivations can be characterised as motivations
for knowledge, which demand accuracy and reliability, and motivations for
action, which demand whatever behaviour will lead to the desired result.
Of course, the same action could mitigate multiple motivations, including
both those for action and those for knowledge at the same time. Clearly, how-
ever, the degree of mitigation would be different for different motivations,
leading to an ability to distinguish between actions on that basis, and on the
basis of the importance or relevance of the motivations in a given context, as
we see below.
3.3. AUTONOMY AND MOTIVATED BEHAVIOUR
The notion of autonomy has associated with it many variations of mean-
ing. According to Steels, autonomous systems must be automatic systems
and, in addition, they must have the capacity to form and adapt their be-
haviour while operating in their environment. Traditional artificial intelli-
gence systems, such as planners, for example, and many robots, are automatic
but not autonomous — they are not independent of the control of their de-
signers (Steels, 1995). Autonomous systems, by contrast, are independent
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and exercise self-control. To do this, we have argued previously (Luck and
d’Inverno, 1998), they must be motivated.
A given stimulus does not always evoke the same response. If the external
situation is constant, differences in response must be ascribed to changes in
the internal state of the responding agent. These differences are due to the
motivations of the agent. In other words, the same action may be beneficial to
differing degrees and with respect to different motivations at different times.
In seeking to provide a computational model for motivation, in support
of the functionality and purpose described above, we can consider an agent
as possessing a fixed range of identifiable motivations of varying strength.
These motivations can be regarded as being innate, and certain behaviours
may be associated with one or more motivations. For example, the behaviour
of feeding is associated with the motivation of obtaining food, or hunger. In
most cases, the execution of such a behaviour reduces the strength of the asso-
ciated motivations, so that in the case of feeding, the motivation to obtain food
is reduced. These behaviours are known as consummatory behaviours; other
behaviours that are not associated with any particular motivation, but which
make the conditions of a consummatory behaviour come true, are known as
appetitive behaviours. For example, a go-to-food behaviour might make the
conditions (that there is food within reach) of the feeding behaviour become
true.
We can thus define autonomous agents to be agents with a higher-level
control provided internally by motivations. Thus we can specify motivations
of curiosity, safety, fear, hunger, and so on. In a simple agent design, we
might then associate the motivation of curiosity with the goal of exploring an
environment which, in turn, is associated with the actions required to achieve
such results. Motivations will also vary over time according to the internal
state of an agent. For example, if an agent spends a long time without food,
then the hunger motivation will increase. When the agent feeds, the hunger
motivation will decrease.
Each motivation thus has a strength associated with it, either variable
depending on external and internal factors, or fixed at some constant value.
In a very simple model (Luck and d’Inverno, 1998), motivation can thus be
represented by a triple, 〈m, v, b〉 known as an m-triple where m is the kind
of motivation, v is a real number, the strength (or intensity (Sloman, 1987))
value associated with that motivation, and b is a boolean variable taking the
value True when the strength value, v , is fixed, and False when it is variable.
An autonomous agent can be regarded as embodying a set of n motiva-
tions, M, which comprises the m-triples, 〈m1, v1, b1〉 . . . 〈mn, vn, bn〉. Thus
the set of motivations, M, is a function of the kind of agent being considered,
while the state of each motivation in this set at a particular point in time is
a function of an instance of a particular kind of agent and its environment
together. In order to act on motivations, a threshold value for strength may be
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necessary, which must be exceeded to force action. Alternatively, the highest
strength value may be used to determine the motivation currently in control.
4. The SMART Agent Framework
We begin by reviewing previous work (d’Inverno and Luck, 1997; Luck and
d’Inverno, 1995), but addressing only those aspects needed to provide an
account of autonomous agents and autonomous interaction. We use the Z no-
tation (Spivey, 1992) to formalise these notions and, though we assume some
familiarity, the meaning should be clear.1 In short, we propose a four-tiered
hierarchy that forms the basis of our formal SMART framework comprising
entities, objects, agents and autonomous agents (Luck and d’Inverno, 1995).
(SMART is an acronym for Structured and Modular Agents and Relationship
Types.) The basic idea underlying this hierarchy is that all components of the
world are entities. Of these entities, some are objects, of which some, in turn,
are agents and of these, some are autonomous agents.
As specified below, an entity comprises a set of motivations, a set of goals,
a set of actions, and a set of attributes such that the attributes are non-empty.
Entities can be used to group together attributes into a whole without any
functionality. They serve as a useful abstraction mechanism by which they
are regarded as distinct from the remainder of the environment, to organise
perception.
While goals are sets of attributes that describe some state of affairs in the
environment, motivations cannot be described in terms of the environment,
and instead are high-level non-derivative drivers of agent activity.
[Attribute, Action, Motivation]
Goal == PAttribute
Entity
attributes : PAttribute
capabilities : PAction
goals : PGoal
motivations : PMotivation
attributes 6= { }
1 The interested reader may consult any of several Z text books, such as (Bowen,
1996; Hayes, 1993; Spivey, 1988; Woodcock and Davies, 1996) for further introduction to
the notation.
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An object is then an entity with abilities that can affect the environment in
which it is situated.
Object
Entity
capabilities 6= { }
Now, an agent is just an object, either that is useful to another agent in
terms of satisfying that agent’s goals, or that exhibits independent purposeful
behaviour. In other words, an agent is an object with an associated set of
goals, but one object may give rise to different instantiations of agents with
different goals.
The idea behind this is that even non-computational entities can be un-
derstood as agents in the sense that the relationship between an object serv-
ing some purpose for someone provides useful information. For example,
in (Luck and d’Inverno, 1995), this was illustrated by reference to a cup
containing some coffee. The point is that although there is nothing compu-
tational about this example, knowledge of the relationship between the cup
and the person who is drinking from it allows a waiter to understand that they
should not remove the cup since it is in use. In this respect, there is a social
relationship between the cup and the drinker, with the cup being an agent of
the drinker.
Agent
Object
goals 6= { }
This notion of agency relies upon the existence of other agents to provide
the goals that are adopted to instantiate an agent. In order to escape an infinite
regress of goal adoption, however, we can define autonomous agents, which
are just agents that generate their own goals from motivations.
AutonomousAgent
Agent
motivations 6= { }
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4.1. PERCEPTION AND MODELLING OF AGENTS
An environment Env is defined to be a simple set of attributes that describes
all of the features of the world. The environment thus represents all possible
percepts in a uniform way. It is convenient also to define a View to be the
perception of an Env by an agent using the same type.
Env == PAttribute
View == PAttribute
Before considering agents that can interact with others (or social agents),
we must first consider situated agents. In this respect, an agent in an en-
vironment can perceive certain attributes which we refer to as the possible
available percepts (posspercepts) subject to its capabilities and current state
but, due to limited resources, may not be able to perceive all attributes. As
a result, the action that an agent chooses to undertake is based on a subset
of percepts, the actual percepts (actualpercepts), determined in relation to its
current goals and motivations.
Thus, in the schema below for agent perception, perceivingactions is a
subset of agent capabilities. Two functions specify what the agent perceives:
canperceive is applied to the current environment and the agent’s capabili-
ties to give potential percepts and willperceive is applied to its motivations,
goals and the current environment to give those attributes that are actually
perceived.
AutonomousAgentPercepts
AutonomousAgent
perceivingactions : PAction
canperceive : Env→ PAction 7→ View
willperceive : PMotivation→ PGoal→ Env→ View
An interaction with the environment occurs as a result of performing
actions in it. We provide the highest possible functional description of the
effects on the environment by introducing the effectinteraction function in
the axiom definition below. This is applied to the current environment, and
the actions taken within it, to return a new environment that results from the
actions being performed.
effectinteraction : Env→ PAction 7→ Env
To specify the actions of an autonomous agent, the next schema includes
the AutonomousAgent schema and an action-selection function that is de-
termined in relation to the motivations, goals, perceived environment and
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environment of the agent. The function gives the set of actions the agent
selects in order to achieve some goal.
AutonomousAgentAct
AutonomousAgent
autoactions : PMotivation→ PGoal→ View→ Env→ PAction
We also need to define the state of an agent by including the previous two
schemas, but now situating it within an environment env. This presents the
agent with a set of potential observable percepts that are a function of both
the environment and its set of perceiving capabilities. However, as discussed
above, and due to perceptual limitations, the actual percepts will be a subset
of those possible, determined in relation to the current goals and motivations.
AutonomousAgentState
AutonomousAgentPercepts
AutonomousAgentAct
env : Env
posspercepts, actualpercepts : View
willdo : PAction
actualpercepts ⊆ posspercepts
posspercepts = canperceive env perceivingactions
actualpercepts = willperceive motivations goals posspercepts
All this defines autonomous agents, but we require more if they are to
engage in interaction or communication episodes. Specifically, for effective
interaction and communication, an agent must be able to group the attributes
that make up the environment into entity-describing models so that it can
identify the other individuals in the world. Of course, some such models
may not contain fully detailed information of other agents, and may instead
omit information about some aspects. For example, a model of another au-
tonomous agent might include information only about their actions but not
their goals.
ObjectModel == Object
AgentModel == Agent
AutoAgentModel == AutonomousAgent
Given this, we can define a social agent to be an agent that is aware of
other agents, and their role and function, through these models. The schema
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below includes models of other autonomous agents available to a social agent
as modelautoagents.
SocialAgent
AutonomousAgentState
modelobjects : PObjectModel
modelagents : PAgentModel
modelautoagents : PAutoAgentModel
As a result, and in summary, a multi-agent system consists of a set of
entities, some of which are objects. Of these objects some are agents and of
these agents some are autonomous. Those autonomous agents that can, in
addition, model other agents are social agents and these are the focus of this
paper: agents that are motivated, autonomous and can model others.
MultiAgentSystem
entities : PEntity
objects : PObject
agents : PAgent
autonomousagents : PAutonomousAgent
socialagents : P SocialAgent
autonomousagents ⊆ agents ⊆ objects ⊆ entities
4.2. GOAL GENERATION AND ADOPTION
The framework described above involves the generation of goals from moti-
vations in an autonomous agent, and the adoption of goals by, and in order
to instantiate, other agents. In this section, we build on earlier initial work in
outlining goal generation and adoption (Luck and d’Inverno, 1996; Luck and
d’Inverno, 1998). In this context, an autonomous agent will try to find a way
to mitigate motivations, either by selecting an action to achieve an existing
goal as above for simple agents, or by retrieving a goal from a repository of
known goals. Thus, our model requires a repository of known goals that cap-
ture knowledge of limited and well-defined aspects of the world. These goals
describe particular states or sub-states of the world, with each autonomous
agent having its own such repository.2
2 Of course, since this repository of goals determines how an agent can satisfy its motiva-
tions, the discovery of new ways of doing so (through new goals that enrich the goal library)
is also interesting. For example, by applying analogical reasoning new goals may be identified
that satisfy motivations and extend the repository. However, while an important issue, this is
is outside the scope of this paper, and we leave its consideration to future work.
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As we have described previously (Luck and d’Inverno, 1996), in order to
retrieve goals to mitigate motivations, an autonomous agent must have some
way of assessing the effects of competing or alternative goals. Clearly, the
goals that make the greatest positive contribution to its motivations should
be selected unless a greater motivational effect can be achieved by dropping
some subset of its goals. The motivational effect of generating or dropping
goals not only depends on the motivations, but also on the goals of the agent.
For example, an autonomous agent should not generate a goal that it already
possesses or that is incompatible with the achievement or satisfaction of its
existing goals.
Formally, the ability of autonomous agents to generate their own goals
is specified in the schema, AssessGoals, which describes how autonomous
agents monitor their motivations for goal generation. First, the AutonomousAgentState
schema is included, and a new variable, goallibrary, is declared to represent
the repository of available known goals. Then, there are two functions to eval-
uate the benefit of generating and dropping current goals. The motiveffectgenerate
function returns a numeric value representing the motivational effect of sat-
isfying a new set of additional goals with a set of motivations, current goals
and current perceptions. Similarly, the motiveffectdestroy function returns a
numeric value representing the motivational effect of removing some subset
of existing goals with the same set of motivations, goals and perceptions.
The predicate part specifies that the current goals must be in the goal li-
brary. For ease of expression, a function is also defined that is related to
motiveffectgenerate, called satisfygenerate, which returns the motivational ef-
fect of an autonomous agent satisfying an additional set of goals. The function
satisfydestroy is analogously related to motiveffectdestroy.
AssessGoals
AutonomousAgentState
goallibrary : P1 Goal
motiveffectgenerate : PMotivation→ PGoal→ View→ PGoal→ Z
motiveffectdestroy : PMotivation→ PGoal→ View→ PGoal→ Z
satisfygenerate, satisfydestroy : PGoal→ Z
goals ⊆ goallibrary
∀ gs : P goallibrary • satisfygenerate gs =
motiveffectgenerate motivations goals actualpercepts gs ∧
satisfydestroy gs =
motiveffectdestroy motivations goals actualpercepts gs
The GenerateGoals operation schema formally describes the generation
of a new set of goals, which changes the state of the agent. The remaining
part of the schema states that there is a set of goals in the goal library that has
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a greater motivational effect than any other set of goals, and the current goals
of the agent are updated to include the new goals.
GenerateGoals
∆AutonomousAgentState
AssessGoals
∃ gs : PGoal | gs ⊆ goallibrary •
(∀ os : PGoal | os ∈ (P goallibrary) •
(satisfygenerate gs ≥ satisfygenerate os) ∧
goals′ = goals ∪ gs)
Once generated by an autonomous agent, goals persist until, for whatever
reason, they are explicitly destroyed by that autonomous agent. The destruc-
tion of goals is defined analogously to the generation of goals, but we do not
specify it here.
This view of goal generation and adoption can be understood as follows.
I might use a bottle to store water for a trip I am taking. Here, the bottle
is instantiated as an agent by me, an autonomous agent, satisfying my goal.
However, I might also share the water, making the bottle of water available
as a community resource, and allowing others to drink from it. The bottle
thus becomes an agent for all of us, satisfying all of our goals. Alternatively,
I could instead hand the bottle to someone else, giving up my ownership of it.
In this situation, I release the bottle from its agency so that it can be an agent
for the other person, who re-instantiates it as such. Interestingly, however,
I cannot force the other person, an autonomous agent, to do so, since my
interaction with them is uncertain. I can suggest that they take the bottle but
they may not do so. The point here is that when there is interaction with other
autonomous agents, we cannot know what will result, so we require a process
that reflects this uncertainty: we require a process of autonomous interaction.
It is worth noting here that this applies as much to assessing and gener-
ating social goals, using models of other agents, as to individual goals. For
example, if one agent has a model of another as being particularly competent
at performing a certain action this may lead to the generation of the goal to
persuade them to perform that action on behalf of the first agent. Similarly,
goals for collaboration may be generated as a result of information from
models of others. For example, if my model of you suggests that you are
an excellent pianist, and I have the goal to sing, then I may generate the
goal to persuade you to play the piano so that I can sing. In all this can be
seen aspects of the creativity process. The better we are at understanding the
actions, goals and motivations of others, the greater the potential to engage,
collaborate, empathise, provoke and challenge others in all kinds of creative
partnerships. Modelling others well is a great skill; the more accurately we
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can do so, the better we become at generating and assessing goals that involve
us working together.
5. Autonomous Interaction
Once the goals defining the purpose of the interaction are generated, in the
manner described above, an agent can continue in its attempt to achieve those
goals. Sometimes these may be specific goals such as wanting to know the
time, or asking a favour, but they can also be more nebulous and include
simply being friendly at a party, or just chatting in a pub. However, in all of
these cases, the Stanislavskian theory of interaction applies: that behind every
utterance (verbal or otherwise) there is a goal of trying to change the mental
state of the listener, and that the utterance serves as a strategy for trying to
achieve this (Merlin, 2006). This notion also underlies our model, and at its
heart is the idea that agents can only know whether they have achieved that
goal by considering the evidence that is available to them after an interaction
episode.
As we have discussed in the introduction, many traditional models of in-
teraction have assumed an ideal world in which unfounded assumptions have
given rise to inadequate characterisations of interaction amongst autonomous
agents. If we consider autonomous interaction to be a goal driven process
of uncertain outcome (which it must be), then we can characterise it in a
more general way as a process of discovery in terms of the effects of ac-
tions (d’Inverno and Luck, 1996). This allows us to deal effectively with the
inherent uncertainty in interaction. In the following discussion, we will begin
to introduce the language of discovery to make the relationships clear.
In order to make sense of our environment and to function effectively
in it, we continually anticipate the effects of our actions and utterances: we
make predictions (or expectations) about what will happen next. The action-
selection function, autoactions, of the AutonomousAgentAct schema encom-
passes the deliberation of the agent in this respect.
The action that is selected is intended to satisfy the goals of the agent
through its resulting effects and consequent changes to the environment. In
the case of an interaction episode involving two agents, the initiating agent
selects an action that is intended to cause the desired response in the re-
sponding agent. The uncertainty inherent in such interaction means that the
effects cannot be known in advance, but can only be discovered after the
event has taken place, or action performed. We describe this by specifying
the predicted effects of actions selected in the AutonomousAgentAct schema
by applying the socialeffectinteract function to the current view of the en-
vironment and those actions. The agent thus predicts that these actions will
change the environment to achieve the desired results. Remember that the
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environment includes all of the entities in it, so that a change to an agent in
the environment will in turn cause a change to the environment itself. We also
introduce a variable, oldpercepts, to store an agent’s actual percepts prior to
an operation.
SocialAgentPredict
SocialAgent
socialeffectinteract : View→ PAction 7→ View
oldpercepts, prediction : View
prediction = socialeffectinteract actualpercepts willdo
prediction ∩ (⋃ goals) 6= {}
Such predictions encapsulate the notions of theory formation in the con-
text of scientific discovery, in which creativity has a strong role to play. It is
exactly here that there is scope for those aspects that have been considered
by many to be outside the scientific process, for it is here that theories are
created in order that they can subsequently be tested and revised as appro-
priate. The interaction process is no different. An agent’s understanding of
its environment (and other agents within it) gives rise to expectations of be-
haviour in others, leading to a determination of what action to take to elicit
a desired response. Note that the model says nothing of how prediction is
actually achieved other than that it is dependent on the environment, percep-
tual abilities, goals, motivations and models of others as discussed above; it
may indeed be done through some complex process involving inspiration or
creativity, or it may simply be a more prosaic operation.3 Either way, this is
where it would be.
Now, in order to achieve the desired result, the relevant actions must be
performed. Effectively, this acts as an experiment, testing whether the predic-
tions generated are consistent with the resulting effects. In this sense, experi-
mentation is central to this model, for such interaction with the environment is
the only way in which an agent’s understanding of its capabilities and its en-
vironment can be assessed to bring to light inadequacies, inconsistencies and
errors. When an action is performed (or utterance spoken), the evidence of the
impact of that action is considered and evaluated by others. In particular, the
action affects the models of other agents, and these are modified to provide
new models (derived from the previous ones) through the updateagentmodels
function. These models of agents are critical in determining if the action was
successful.
3 One possible technique that might be adopted in this context is reinforcement learning,
but this is outside the scope of this paper, so we do not consider it further.
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SocialAgentInteract
SocialAgentPredict
updateagentmodels : PAutoAgentModel→ View→ PAutoAgentModel
The action also has an effect on the environment, which changes accord-
ingly, and a similar effect on the acting agent itself, whose percepts also
change. For example, in the case of an action that issues a request to an-
other agent to tell the current time, the resulting model will either encode
the fact that the agent is telling the time, or not. By inspecting this model
and its attributes, the requesting agent can determine if its action has been
successful. Note that the new value of oldpercepts takes the previous value of
actualpercepts for later use.
SocialEnv
∆SocialAgentPredict
SocialAgentInteract
env′ = socialeffectinteract env′ perceivingactions
posspercepts′ = canperceive env′ perceivingactions
actualpercepts′ = willperceive motivations goals posspercepts′
willdo′ = autoactions motivations goals actualpercepts′ env′
modelautoagents′ =
updateagentmodels modelautoagents actualpercepts
oldpercepts′ = actualpercepts
prediction′ = prediction
Evaluating the results of actions appears simple. At the most basic level,
it involves the comparison of predictions with observations. Thus, if the in-
tended effects of one’s actions and the actual effects match, then the actions
have achieved the desired result and the episode is successful. If they are
anomalous, then it reveals an erroneous understanding of the environment
and the agents within it, or an inadequate capability for perception of the
results. The important point here is that there is no guarantee of success, and
failure can be due to any number of reasons.
This analysis assumes that the evidence is perfect, however, which may
not always be appropriate. In any real environment this is not so, and error
can be introduced into evidence in a variety of ways, reducing the quality
of the observed evidence accordingly. Not only may there be inaccuracy due
to the inherent uncertainty in both performing actions and perception of the
results (experimentation and observation respectively), but also, if the actions
taken by the agent are communicative actions intended to elicit a response
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from another autonomous agent, then there may be inaccuracy due to ma-
licious intent on the part of the responding agent by providing misleading
information, for example (Marsh, 1994). Thus the response may itself be the
vessel for the error. For example, when requesting someone to tell the time
in a noisy room, one may not be certain of whether the request was heard
or even understood. Evaluating the evidence allows an appropriate response,
which may or may not included modifying models of others.
In addition to assessing the fit of observations with predictions, therefore,
the quality of the observations themselves must also be assessed in order to
ascertain whether they are acceptable to be used in the comparison at all.
Simple tolerance levels for assessing the acceptability of perceived evidence
are inadequate, for they do not consider the need for the interaction episode,
and the importance of achieving the desired result. The quality demanded of
the observations can thus only be assessed in relation to the motivations of
the agent. These provide a measure of the importance of the situation, and
take into account the implications of success and failure. In medical domains,
for example, where agents are highly motivated, even a small degree of error
in interaction concerning relevant patient details may be unacceptable if it
would lead to the loss of a patient’s life, while neighbourly discussion of the
weather with low motivations and little importance may allow a far greater
error tolerance.
The schemas below describe evaluation with two functions. First, accept
is a predicate that holds between the capabilities of the agent, its perceived
environment before and after the actions were performed, and its agent mod-
els, when there is sufficient evidence to accept it. The capabilities of the agent
capture the uncertainty information that arises from the agent itself, while the
perceived environment and agent models include details of difficulties arising
through the environment, or other agents. The predicate consider compares
predictions and observations once evidence is accepted. The predicate holds
when the predictions and observations are considered to be consistent. Note
that the potentially difficult question of when observations match predictions
is bound up in the predicate itself, which may be interpreted either as a simple
equality test or as something more sophisticated.
The second schema also states at the beginning that though the agent
changes (∆SocialAgent) as a result of this evaluation, the state of the agent
remains the same (ΞAutonomousAgentState). Finally, if the evidence is ac-
cepted, and the observations are not consistent with the predictions, then
the agent models must be revised in an appropriate way as specified by the
revisemodels function.
Note that creativity can manifest itself strongly in both evaluation and
revision. First, evaluation is intimately tied to perception as indicated above,
where perception can be regarded as having a very strong bearing on cre-
ativity since this perception may vary from individual to individual. Second,
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revision of models can be achieved in infinitely many ways. Determining
which revision to apply is also determined by perception, and can give rise to
different outcomes, depending on the individual involved. Importantly, both
of these aspects determine how these models can change.
SocialAgentEvaluate
SocialAgent
accept : P(PAction× View× View× PAutonomousAgent)
consider : P(View× View)
SocialAgentDecides
∆SocialAgent
ΞAutonomousAgentState
SocialAgentPredict
SocialAgentEvaluate
revisemodels : View→ PAutoAgentModel→ PAutoAgentModel
accept(capabilities, actualpercepts, oldpercepts, modelautoagents) ∧
consider(prediction, actualpercepts)⇒
modelautoagents′ = revisemodels actualpercepts modelautoagents
6. Discussion
6.1. CREATIVITY THROUGH SOFTWARE
The emerging field of computational creativity is no longer a nascent area, but
is now becoming increasingly well established (e.g., (Colton et al., 2009; Car-
doso et al., 2009)). Colton (Colton, 2012) describes the field as being con-
cerned with building software that is independently creative so as either to act
in partnership with people or to be an “autonomous artist, musician, writer,
designer, engineer or scientist.” Interestingly, he suggests that software can
act as more than a simple tool for creative activity, a view also held by many
others in the computational creativity field (Cohen et al., 2012; Jones et al.,
2012; McCormack and d’Inverno, 2012a), where creativity can be inspired
by interacting with computational systems as autonomous agents(Blackwell
et al., 2012; McCormack and d’Inverno, 2012b).
Yet simple tools are also relevant for creativity; Clark (Clark, 2008), for
example, discusses how the application of pen on paper in writing means that
neither can be considered as passive artefact but as fundamental machinery
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responsible for “the shape of the flow of thoughts and ideas.” Though not
directly referring to such objects as adopting the goals of a human as part
of the creative process, the ideas here are clearly analogous to goal adoption
by objects as we have described in this paper. With software, which can be
responsive in ways not possible with passive artefacts, new possibilities arise
for interacting in the creative process.
Indeed, Jones et al. (Jones et al., 2012) argue that partnerships with au-
tonomous agents, for which the outcome of an interaction cannot be known, is
different from the use of traditional tools in two important aspects. First, these
can extend our practice through new capabilities or trajectories that would
not otherwise have been possible. Second, by mirroring our own creative be-
haviours, they enable us to reflect on our behaviour in order to disrupt existing
habits. By moving one step further, to autonomous software, we arrive at a
new kind of partnership in which the tool itself can be viewed as creative.
This suggests a new kind of relationship with (at least partially) equal partners
rather than the more typical relationship involving unidirectional usage of a
tool.
Consider the the work of Cohen and his system for drawing and painting,
AARON (McCorduck, 1991), which represents one of the biggest successes
of creative partnerships with a computational tool, both in terms of critical
appraisal in the art world and some acceptance by collectors and galleries.
Cohen does not consider AARON as autonomous, but discusses the way that
it has been developed to paint in his style, as well as how his style has been
affected by feedback from the software (Cohen et al., 2012). Such a creative
partnership can arise when the interaction is much closer to autonomous in-
teraction as described in this paper and moves beyond what is possible with
non-computational systems. (Indeed, when discussing AARON, Cohen often
ascribes the system human characteristics.)
AARON is not unique. Colton is developing the Painting Fool, a system
that he hopes will one day produce visual art that can be displayed alongside
human art, and given equal value (Colton, 2012). As work progresses, he
increases the artistic autonomy of the system, acting as the evaluator of out-
puts to improve the system, and often expressing surprise and delight at the
system producing novelty in his eyes. More challenging for Colton, however,
is to get an external audience to see its creative value. Similarly, Pachet has
spent a decade or more developing autonomous and semi-autonomous sys-
tems that capture the musical performance of a user and then play a modified
version back using a range of learning and statistical techniques (Pachet,
2002; Pachet, 2010; Pachet, 2012). Importantly, these are both instances of
autonomous interaction as described here, since it is not known which aspects
of the music (in Pachet’s case) will be developed and in what way, nor how it
will interact with a human over the course of any performance.
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One consequence of this is that it can lead to a heightened desire on the
part of the user to listen more carefully, and open awareness to the system in
order to build up meaningful musical conversations, in ways that might not be
done otherwise, even (or especially) with human interactions. The unexpected
results of such systems may thus be used to push and develop creativity in
people. Of course, much of this depends on how a human user chooses to
model any computational system. By choosing a motivated agent model with
its own musical goals and perceptions, and treating interaction as a process
of discovery as described earlier, a creative partnership is much more likely
than if treating it merely as a passive artefact.
There are new opportunities for creativity to be challenged, provoked,
augmented or extended by more autonomous interaction with increasingly
autonomous computational systems. These systems can provide the critical
element surprise in interaction and even “super-surprise” as suggested by the
pioneering artist Frieder Nake (Cohen et al., 2012). Moreover, they provide
the potential for beginners as well as practicing artists to engage in creative
practice.
6.2. CREATIVITY THROUGH AUTONOMY
In our view, and as we have argued in this paper and elsewhere, the autonomy
of agents arises through their being guided by internal motivations in deter-
mining their perception and action. This gives rise to different behaviour from
different individuals, even in the same circumstances, which is seemingly a
fundamental characteristic of creativity. Indeed, if everyone behaved in the
same way, then consideration of creativity becomes meaningless, since it is
indistinguishable from anything else. In this respect, autonomy can be seen
to be a driver for creativity; it may not specify exactly what arises as a result,
but in our view it is a necessary pre-requisite for creativity to occur.
Importantly, there are two aspects here. Behaviour, as discussed through-
out this paper, is the manifestation of creativity, since it is only through the
actions of agents that creativity is realised. However, the SMART framework
also reveals a second, no less critical aspect in that autonomy affects not just
what agents do, but also what they perceive. Since an agent’s perceptions
(as well as its behaviour) are determined in relation its motivations, we open
up the possibility for different individuals to be exposed to different percep-
tual inputs, leading to different outputs as a result. For example, the vivid
colours and style of impressionist paintings suggest a different way of seeing
the world that one might argue is determined by the observers’ motivations.
Without dwelling on the detail, we believe that our simple model captures this
notion of motivated perception in a very abstract way, but one that shows the
capacity of perception to influence behaviour of all kinds, potentially leading
to the kind of outputs that we would happily deem creative. Clearly, the detail
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is critical to a full understanding of the creative process, but the key point is
that it is captured and can realised (or instantiated) in appropriate ways.
6.3. CREATIVITY THROUGH DISCOVERY
The history of science is littered with examples of creativity in devising new
theories, models and experiments. While science is commonly taken to be
a methodical and systematic process, there is still room for inspiration and
intuition; indeed, some argue that this is perhaps the single key ingredient
for fundamentally new scientific discoveries. Despite not providing a compu-
tational model for this creative aspect, we recognise its role in the process.
Importantly, we see discovery as a process of interaction with the environ-
ment, carrying out experiments to test some theory, and continuing to provide
new theories in response to the results. But this is not confined to science; it
is what happens every day in all manner of situations when dealing with the
uncertain environment that is the real world. We continually make predictions
about our environment and adjust our behaviour in light of events. In this
view, it makes sense to consider autonomous interaction as discovery as we
have done in this paper, bringing to bear the same processes, but perhaps for
ends that are important only for the individual rather than society as a whole.
More specifically in relation to interaction as discovery, we have neces-
sarily presented a simple model; there are many other aspects for which we
could have given far more detail. For example, we have not considered how
to revise an agent’s models in case its actions do not bring about the desired
result, yet this is in itself an important but complex process, and one in which
creativity must be present in some form. Indeed, much research into the prob-
lems of discovery comes under the heading of theory revision, or in the case
of interaction as discussed here, model revision. Given an existing theory, new
evidence will either be consistent with that theory or it will be anomalous. If
it is consistent, then there is no cause for further reasoning since the theory
is adequate. If the observations are anomalous, however, then the theory is
refuted and must either be discarded or revised so that the anomaly is removed
and the theory is once more consistent with observations. In the revision stage
can be seen that part of the discovery cycle that is actually responsible for
the construction of new theories, for the essence of the creativity involved.
Yet perhaps we can argue that this creativity arises as a result of interaction,
whether it be with the environment as is typical in science, or with other
individuals (human or agent) in other areas.
6.4. CONCLUSIONS
Many critics of artificial intelligence argue that the real power of the tech-
nology lies in the hands of the programmers who manipulate and tweak their
designs to suit circumstances. They argue that extensive programmer (or user)
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intervention invalidates much of the benefit to be gained from this work by
demanding modifications for each novel situation. One of the ways in which
this can be countered is by making intelligent systems autonomous, by giving
them the power to control themselves. A significant contribution of this paper
has been to show that autonomy can be achieved through the modelling and
use of the motivations of a reasoning agent. In contrast to other work on
motivations, this paper aims to show how motivations affect reasoning and
action in the world, rather than how action and reasoning in the world affect
motivations. Moreover, the reasoning and action addressed are not the simple
behavioural-response kind, but of higher level reasoning strategies.
Of course, the model proposed in this paper is clearly at a high-level,
and provides only a basic indication of how motivations may themselves be
organised and related, and how they give rise to different kinds of behaviours.
However, it provides well-defined framework within which a richer analysis
of the relationships between motivations, by which some motivations may in-
hibit others, or some motivations may generalise others, could provide much
stronger insights into impact on creativity. The model we have presented
opens up all kinds of potential avenue for further research.
In summary, in this paper we have sought to bring together several strands
of work, on motivation (Luck and d’Inverno, 1998), autonomous agents (d’Inverno
and Luck, 2004; Luck and d’Inverno, 1996) and interaction (d’Inverno and
Luck, 1996) on the one hand, and on discovery on the other. In doing so,
we have sought to show how the notions of creativity that Boden has so elo-
quently espoused (Boden, 2004; Boden, 2010) have a central place in relation
to the design of modern computing systems of intelligent agents. However,
it is only in the detail of analysis that these aspects are visible. Just as it is
sometimes easy to dismiss the creativity of the street artist, it is also easy to
dismiss the creativity in everyday interaction. To do so would be a mistake.
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